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Abstract – Virus checking is an established process 
in most pre-ingest digital preservation workflows. It 
is typically included as part of a general threat model 
response and there has to date been relatively little 
research into the virus checking function specifically 
within a long term context. The British Library recently 
began a small research project to explore this issue, 
using data from a legacy digital collection established 
by the ‘Flashback’ project and supplementary data 
provided by the UK Web Archive. Our poster presents 
this research and findings to date, raising questions 
about the overhead of virus checking at scale, when 
organizations should virus-check content, and the 
legacy capabilities of anti-virus software.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Memory organizations typically conduct malware 
checks on collections as a pre-ingest step in digital 
preservation workflows, so that ‘infected’ materials can 
be identified and dealt with before inflicting damage on 
users’ computers or the organization’s network. Such a 
step is widely considered to be best practice; however, 
it is generally employed in response to a general threat 
model and there is less clarity about the actuality of 
malware risks over the longer-term, particularly with 
legacy content that is rarely accessed. Many institutions 
are thus incurring virus-checking overheads during 
ingest processing when it is less than clear exactly how 
malware risks might manifest. Malware is, effectively, 
something of a blind spot in evidence-based digital 
preservation practices. 
Acknowledging this blind spot, in late 2018 the 
British Library initiated a small research project that 
focused specifically on the virus checking function 
within digital preservation and processing workflows, 
including a three month PhD research placement. This 
poster introduces that work, provides a high level 
overview of malware in the Library’s legacy ‘Flashback’ 
corpus and the UK Web Archive, and explores some of 
the research questions the project seeks to address 
II. WHAT IS MALWARE? 
Malware is a catch-all term that refers to various 
types of ‘malicious software,’ including viruses, worms, 
Trojan horses, spyware and ransomware. It is often 
designed for a specific computing environment or 
application. Viruses and other types of malware can not 
only disrupt or damage these environments, they may 
also provide unauthorized access to computer 
environments and/or information. According to 
Farbowitz [1], the ‘two characteristics common to most 
malware are that it operates without the consent of the 
computer user or network administrator, and that much 
of it self-replicates in order to spread.’ 
Malware and viruses can be identified and removed 
by anti-virus (AV) software. These use multiple 
techniques to counter the threat of malware. For 
example, AV software providers identify and collect 
‘signatures’ that correlate to specific instances of 
malware. The signature databases for the products 
grow over time and are regularly updated with new 
definition files. AV software also uses heuristic analysis 
to identify malware, examining code for suspicious 
properties. 
III. MALWARE AT THE BRITISH LIBRARY 
The British Library does not actively collect malware 
as collection items, however, malware is known to have 
been found in other items acquired by the Library for 
preservation. This research is based on malware located 
in two key datasets: the Flashback corpus and the UK 
Web Archive. 
The ‘Flashback’ corpus consists of disc images of 
legacy digital content originally acquired by the British 
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Library on handheld media such as floppy disc or CD. 
The corpus dates from between approximately 1980 to 
2010. [2] The UK Web Archive is a more modern 
dataset, comprised of millions of UK-relevant websites 
harvested annually under the UK Non-Print Legal 
Deposit Regulations (2013). Collectively these two 
sources provide a sample of both legacy and 
contemporary malware, delivered and acquired through 
common malware distribution mechanisms for their 
respective periods. 
The Flashback corpus has been the focus of the 
analysis to date. At the time that this analysis was 
undertaken (February 2019), a total of 22,061 disks had 
been imaged, roughly half of which were CD-ROM or 
CD-R, just under a third were 3.5” floppy discs, and the 
remainder were either 5.25” floppies or Digital Versatile 
Discs (DVDs). All of the discs were virus-checked prior 
to being imaged. Of these, 120 of the discs were 
identified as containing some kind of malware. While 
this will inevitably include an unquantified number of 
false-positives, this means that 0.54% of the Flashback 
disk images have so far been classified as containing 
malware.  
The majority of malware-positive files identified 
within the Flashback corpus to date have been found on 
disks imaged from consumer computer magazine cover 
disks, mainly CD-ROMs and DVD-ROMs published 
during the 2000s, although some have also been 
located on non-magazine-based items. Not all of these 
files, however, represent the same level of risk. For 
example, three of the magazine cover disks contained 
joke programs, which seem to have been intentionally 
distributed with the disks. However, a further item, a 
disk acquired with PC Gamer No. 58 (July 1998, Disk B), 
was found to contain three files infected with the 
Marburg virus, designed to run on Windows 95/98. The 
visual effect of the Marburg virus is repeated instances 
of the Windows error icon overlaid on screen content, 
though it was also found to delete integrity bases of 
known AV products. [3]. In addition, a large number of 
files contained macro viruses written for MS Word, 
though there are also many examples of files identified 
as Trojans and, at the other extreme, a file containing 
a fragment of a boot-sector virus that was apparently 
frequently encountered ‘in the wild’ in the floppy disk 
era. 
Rates of malware in the UK Web Archive are 
calculated differently from those in the Flashback 
corpus. The Flashback concept of an ‘item’ does not 
transfer to the UK Web Archive, as the boundaries of 
any given website are fluid due to the inherent ‘linking’ 
system upon which the web is reliant. Malware data for 
the UK Web Archive is thus currently only available as a 
percentage of the overall size of the data. We refer to 
this as the percentage of the stored data flagged as 
malware-infected, rather than the collection. Up until 
the end of 2017, malware in the UK Web Archive 
accounted for less than 0.01% of the stored data.  
IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The percentage of stored data from the UK Web 
Archive is significantly lower than the percentage of 
malware infected items in the Flashback corpus. That 
may be explained by the difference in measurement. 
Further work is planned in coming months to address 
this, as is identification of the various malware 
programs and their functions. Nonetheless, the 
relatively high percentage of malware-flagged items 
found in the Flashback corpus indicates that virus 
checking remains necessary. Given the inevitable 
processing overheads of virus checking at scale, and 
considering that access rates for content are relatively 
low, we intend to explore whether it might be more 
efficient to virus check primarily at the point of access, 
rather than at ingest. To answer this question we need 
a better understanding of at least two things: 
a) the threat model for storing malware in a long 
term digital repository 
b) the performance of virus checking software over 
time.  
Threat model analysis will consider, for example, 
the functionality of the malware found in our samples 
and the likelihood of malware activation within a 
controlled read-only storage environment. Regarding 
performance of AV software over time, we expect that 
the capabilities of AV software to identify malware 
should improve as it encounters more samples: this 
would suggest that delaying the virus-scanning process 
may result in a more comprehensive output (including 
a reduction in the number of ‘false positives’). On the 
other hand there is a gap in the literature to definitively 
confirm that legacy signatures relating to obsolete 
malware are never removed from providers’ databases: 
this may result in a limit as to how long it is viable to 
delay the virus checking function. Evidence is needed 
either way. 
The poster will reflect up-to-date findings for these 
research questions and will prompt valuable debate and 
discussion with conference attendees to help drive this 
currently under-researched area forwards.  
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